

**Did Eisenhower's  
New Look  
Defence Policy  
Make America  
Safer or Not?**

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The foreign policy of the United States under the Presidency of Dwight D Eisenhower was one that is now often viewed under the complete umbrella of the New Look, or more accurately, the policy of Massive Retaliation. This was a policy that came to the forefront of public attention after a speech by Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, just five days after President Eisenhower himself had declared in his State of the Union address that it would be American policy to maintain "a massive capability to strike back"<sup>1</sup>. The actual roots of this thinking however lay further back in time with Eisenhower's own belief in fiscal conservatism, limited government and a remembrance of an American standing army that had, prior to the Second World War, been relatively small. Eisenhower certainly did not want to reduce the US army to what it had been prior to that war but he did want to reduce military expenditure by relying more on strategic, read nuclear, weapons. The Massive Retaliation policy would then achieve two aims at once – it would help to reduce what Eisenhower saw as wasteful government expenditure while at the same time bringing about the develop of a comprehensive doctrine for the usage of atomic weapons. Although the Pentagon was never enamoured with spending cuts Eisenhower's intentions for the Massive Retaliation policy were reasonable and clear. As much as the US needed defence capabilities, it also needed to have a vibrant economy that would safeguard, in itself, the American way of life and this would only occur, he believed, if inflationary government spending was cut. The guidelines of the Truman administration's document NSC-68 were deemed as being too broad and militaristic to be sustainable for Washington into the future while the massive US lead in nuclear weapons capability was seen as almost useless if not exploited. Thus rather than troops having to be at the beck and call of a policy of containment, the US would save money and instead use a psychological weapon, the threat of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons, if the Soviet Union or China was

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<sup>1</sup> Samuel F. Wells, Jr., 'The Origins of Massive Retaliation', *Political Science Quarterly* 1 (1981), pp. 31 – 52: 33.

deemed to be acting too aggressively towards the West. As much as the policy was clever it also had many shortcomings for it is probable that no one was ever quite sure how far the US was willing to be pushed before Eisenhower would give the order for Strategic Air Command to hit Moscow. Not only that but, as Dulles noted, could its allies depend on the US to invite nuclear disaster on itself in their defence? Perhaps the most profound effect of the Massive Retaliation policy was the subsequent Soviet build up in ICBM's and the acceleration of an arms race in the area of hydrogen bombs and long range delivery systems. It is this last effect that perhaps marks the policy as being one that made the US less safe than it had been prior to its initiation.

The terms 'Massive Retaliation' and 'New Look' are often used interchangeably in the context of Eisenhower's reorganisation of America's defence posture possibly due to the usage of the latter term by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford at the Press Club in Washington in December 1953<sup>2</sup> and the subsequent use of the former in Dulles' speech the following month. The two terms however are not as interchangeable as they may seem to be. The New Look was Eisenhower's policy to reduce government expenditure on defence through a reorganisation of the various sectors of the defence establishment in order to cut down on waste and duplication between services. Truman's defence budgets had been notoriously high through both the implementation of NSC-68 which called for a massive military build-up in order to better challenge the Soviet Union and also because of the ongoing war in Korea. In 1952 the defence budget reached a high of \$566.8 billion (in constant value 2007 dollars)<sup>3</sup>. This figure, while unprecedented in the

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<sup>2</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House years: Mandate for change* (New York, 1963), p.449.

<sup>3</sup> Warren Wheeler, 'The American Defense Budget', 18 September, 2007, *Centre for Defense Information* (online). Available: <http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/Defense%20Spending%20Over%20Time.pdf>

immediate years before it, was one that Eisenhower believed to be unsustainable and a drain on the economy if allowed to go unchecked. While the ending of the Korean War certainly assisted in deflating the defence budget, a genuine effort was made by Eisenhower to lower the budget anyway as he sincerely believed in a more prudent defence policy as outlined in NSC 162/2 where “the maintenance of a sound, strong and growing economy”<sup>4</sup> was cited as being the second most important factor in securing the US. It should be noted though that his first defence budget was triple the one of 1950 but yet he stated repeatedly that “long-term security required a sound economy”<sup>5</sup> which for him meant less defence spending. Eisenhower put this most explicitly in his Chance for Peace speech where he explained that the “cost of one modern heavy bomber is this...it is two fine, fully equipped hospitals”<sup>6</sup>. During his election campaign Eisenhower had repeatedly criticized the defence policy of President Truman as being reactionary, negative, and composed of fighting the Soviets on terms that Moscow was deciding. The stalemated Korean War was seen as testament to this but Eisenhower promised a “policy of boldness”<sup>7</sup> in order to retake the initiative in the Cold War fight and allow America to choose its battles rather than having to, through an orthodox belief in containment, act at any time to all forms of perceived Communist aggression. However, despite this change in policy Eisenhower was quite aware of the need not to appear weak on defence, and thus damage US credibility in the face of any possible threats from Moscow. This is where Massive Retaliation appears as the consequence of the New Look policy. As Washington could not afford to continue with expanding its various armed

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<sup>4</sup> James S. Lay, ‘A Report to the National Security Council (NSC 162/2)’, National Security Council (Washington DC, 1953), pp. 1 – 27: 6. Available: <http://ftp.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House years: Mandate for change* (New York, 1963), p.452.

<sup>6</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘A Chance for Peace’, 16 April, 1953. Washington DC, 1953. *Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission* (online). Available: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speeches/19530416%20Chance%20for%20Peace.htm>

<sup>7</sup> Samuel F. Wells, Jr., ‘The Origins of Massive Retaliation’, *Political Science Quarterly* 1 (1981), pp. 31 – 52: 32

services, and knowing it could never come close to matching the manpower available to the Soviets, it decided to build a huge lead in nuclear weapons which would be delivered through the strike-force of Strategic Air Command<sup>8</sup>. The cost of maintaining a vast force of nuclear weapons far outweighed the budgetary implications of granting more divisions to the army as soldiers and other associated personnel invariably cost more to the government than did nuclear weapons. Wholesale cutbacks were not on the agenda though as Eisenhower, in his 1954 State of the Union address, spoke about the heavy emphasis that air power, through both the air force and the navy, would garner through his administration<sup>9</sup>. This was, of course, because the nuclear weapons that would be the cornerstone of his defence policy would be delivered by means of aircraft and not ICBM's which were still an item not yet in any mature stage of development. However not only would this policy of Massive Retaliation save money, it would also allow the Eisenhower administration to develop a doctrine for the usage of nuclear weapons through the assumed guidelines and rhetoric associated with the policy. This was something that, it could be argued, was missing from American defence policies under the Truman administration and perhaps remained so even through the Massive Retaliation policy years. This was to prove to be a major stumbling block in the actual success of the policy itself, and would lead to its eventual disintegration through both of the Eisenhower administrations. While it certainly disintegrated as policy through the later years of his second term in office, cracks appeared in the policy from the very beginning as no clear limit was set on how much aggression the US was willing to tolerate before using its vast nuclear forces. How would its Allies in Europe know for certain at which point the US would launch a defence of them in the case of an attack from the Soviet Union because in doing so it would itself be inviting a nuclear attack on mainland America? At the same time it must be

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<sup>8</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President* (London, 1984), p. 171.

<sup>9</sup> Samuel F. Wells, Jr., 'The Origins of Massive Retaliation', *Political Science Quarterly* 1 (1981), pp. 31 – 52: 33.

asked how applicable the strategy was to limited wars? With so many questions left unanswered the policy could never be as successful as hoped because it brought about a measure of confusion inside the White House and defence departments leading to the policy continually being revised and patched up in order to fit different situations.

The Eisenhower election campaign contained various hints that the former Supreme Commander of NATO would, through the New Look foreign policy, attempt to roll back Communism from some countries on the periphery of the Soviet sphere of influence. This view was most adamantly put forward by John Foster Dulles and although it would probably have been impossible to carry out, the policy of Massive Retaliation would not allow for it anyway which shows from the outset an immediate contradiction in policy terms. This of course is not to say that the Eisenhower administration did not work around this by using the CIA in such instances as the Iranian coup and also in the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala but this usage of covert forces was not designed as part of the Massive Retaliation strategy. Despite realising they could not roll back Communism, both Eisenhower and Dulles did realise that they could possibly use the policy to prevent its spread. Early on in the administration both men agreed on the usefulness of the policy as shown by the apparent success of the nuclear diplomacy that they waged against North Korea and China in order to stop any aggression that may have restarted the Korean War, an ending of which was an Eisenhower election campaign promise. The threat of nuclear war was also used by the two men against China in order to bring an end to the Quemoy-Matsu crisis<sup>10</sup>. While Dulles, more so than Eisenhower, advocated a policy of brinkmanship in which the US would “undertake certain efforts to prevent further significant expansion of Soviet power, even at the risk of

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<sup>10</sup> Campbell Craig, *Destroying the village: Eisenhower and thermonuclear war* (New York, 1998), p.50.

war”<sup>11</sup>, it was shown that this belief did not coexist as well with the policy of Massive Retaliation as it perhaps should have. As Secretary of State he made it clear that Washington should not be afraid to act just because of a fear of Soviet retaliation but seemed to change position when Vice President Nixon pronounced that “...we would rely primarily on our mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we chose”<sup>12</sup>. Dulles was quick to distance himself from this aggressive rhetoric when he later wrote publicly that if there was deemed to be Communist aggression somewhere in Asia then nuclear weapons would not necessarily be dropped on China or Russia<sup>13</sup>. This was almost an about-turn on what the New Look policy was meant to entail and so, again, the question of when the Eisenhower administration would use nuclear weapons was still left unanswered. The fact that two of the most public figures in the administration held wildly varying, almost unpredictable views, towards the usage of nuclear weapons through the policy of Massive Retaliation should have been a cause for concern and a sign early on that the policy was one that would prove too inflexible in the Cold War struggle with Moscow. While Dulles’ position as regards the usage of nuclear weapons softened, his new position conflicted with President Eisenhower’s guidelines which were formulated into NSC 5422/2 showing yet more divisions within the administration. Ever since toning down his earlier rhetoric on the policy of Massive Retaliation, Dulles had moved to a point where he intended to remove the stigma from the usage of nuclear weapons due to technological developments which would allow them to be used tactically in the battlefield. Thus they could be used in instances of smaller, localized conflicts of which the Massive

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<sup>11</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians’, in Richard H. Immerman, (ed.), *John Foster Dulles and the diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, 1990), pp 47 – 77: 50.

<sup>12</sup> Samuel F. Wells, Jr., ‘The Origins of Massive Retaliation’, *Political Science Quarterly* 1 (1981), pp. 31 – 52: 35.

<sup>13</sup> John Foster Dulles, ‘Policy for Security and Peace’, *Foreign Affairs* 3 (1954), pp. 353 – 364: 359.

Retaliation policy was at its weakest. However Eisenhower held a much more ominous view in that he knew the usage of nuclear weapons would lead to an all out nuclear exchange which “would threaten the survival of Western civilization and the Soviet regime”<sup>14</sup> while also pointing out that any war between the two superpowers could not be limited with tactical nuclear weapons but rather it would be waged “with all available weapons”<sup>15</sup>. Despite these more realistic notions Eisenhower was still quoted as saying that his administration would allow tactical nuclear weapons to be used “just as exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else”<sup>16</sup>. Even with this announcement it is still clear that Dulles and Eisenhower were certainly not singing from the same hymn sheet and this continued to be the case for some time as Eisenhower, in a world of atomic weaponry, could not seem to comprehend the concept of a limited war and thus the almost constant reliance on a policy of Massive Retaliation with no in-built flexibility clause. On top of this, and even with the changing rhetoric associated with the policy, the question of when nuclear weapons would actually be used was still one that remained largely unanswered and this was a cause of aggravation for the Eisenhower’s Joint Chiefs. The President did state to the Joint Chiefs that he would approve them for use in any war with the Soviets while the Joint Chiefs argued that if both superpowers possessed atomic weapons then both sides would deter each other from using them to a point where the US could rely on this to prepare instead for smaller wars<sup>17</sup>. Eisenhower again did not see any war between the superpowers being confined to conventional weapons and kept to the view that there was no point in trying to fight the Soviets with more troops as the US had but 5 divisions in Europe, the Soviets had 35 times as

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<sup>14</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians’, in Richard H. Immerman, (ed.), *John Foster Dulles and the diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, 1990), pp 47 – 77: 53.

<sup>15</sup> Campbell Craig, *Destroying the village: Eisenhower and thermonuclear war* (New York, 1998), p.49.

<sup>16</sup> Campbell Craig, *Destroying the village: Eisenhower and thermonuclear war* (New York, 1998), p.52.

<sup>17</sup> Campbell Craig, *Destroying the village: Eisenhower and thermonuclear war* (New York, 1998), p.60.

many and thus atomic weaponry could be the only answer to this disparity<sup>18</sup>. This further clashing of viewpoints marked out the policy of Massive Retaliation as being one that, in its inflexibility, was making the US less safe than it could possibly have been. This contradiction was to become ever more pronounced with the growing international concern about the policy and the impending Soviet nuclear build up.

Eisenhower's firm stance on Massive Retaliation was based on the premise that the US would always maintain a huge lead in the production and deliverability of nuclear weapons as emphasized by the defining document of the Massive Retaliation policy, NSC 162/2 of 1953, wherein it states that the US should "conduct...development so as to insure superiority in quantity and quality of weapons systems"<sup>19</sup>. This lead was vital so that the policy would act as a threat against the Chinese and the Soviets. Without a viable threat the policy would only bring about a stalemate as predicted by NSC 162/2 which stated that "increasing Soviet atomic capability may tend to diminish the deterrent effect of US atomic power against peripheral Soviet aggression"<sup>20</sup>. A stalemate, while it would possibly allow both sides to possess nuclear weapons and yet not use them, would have many repercussions for American policy and despite the possibility of it perhaps bringing about an uneasy peace, make the US less safe than it had been before the policies implementation. Before Eisenhower's policy of Massive Retaliation was unveiled Soviet atomic capability was growing but with the acceleration of nuclear technologies and the higher dependence on these

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<sup>18</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House years: Mandate for change* (New York, 1963), p.453.

<sup>19</sup> James S. Lay, 'A Report to the National Security Council (NSC 162/2)', National Security Council (Washington DC, 1953), pp. 1 – 27: 7. Available: <http://ftp.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> James S. Lay, 'A Report to the National Security Council (NSC 162/2)', National Security Council (Washington DC, 1953), pp. 1 – 27: 4. Available: <http://ftp.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf>

weapons that the Massive Retaliation policy demanded, Moscow had no choice but to attempt to develop its own system of Massive Retaliation. It was the only logical choice for the leaders in The Kremlin as it could not allow itself to be dictated to by a United States that, through the means of atomic weaponry, had the constant opportunity to launch a pre-emptive strike. While the New Look policy, and its conception of Massive Retaliation, was a middle ground whereby the US could fulfil its defence obligations without overspending, it was also a policy which was not flexible enough in order to reassure its allies throughout the world, much less calm a Soviet Union which, once it had built up its own nuclear base, no longer need fear it. In fact in a memorandum Rear Admiral of the US Navy, Roy Johnson, suggested that the Soviets would, due to nuclear parity, be encouraged to increase their aggressiveness in Cold War and limited-war fronts<sup>21</sup>. Nuclear parity would not have had to occur had Eisenhower not initiated a policy in order to gain the, so-called initiative in the Cold War, and while it is acceptable that the costs of Truman's defence policies were too much for the US economy to bear in the long term, a nuclear build up, along with the early aggressive rhetoric as espoused by Vice-President Nixon and by Secretary of State Dulles, only served to bring about a response from the Soviets in terms of it building up its own nuclear deterrent. This response, along with the varying positions of many important people in the Eisenhower administration on the subject of the usage of the policy served to bring about fears that US allies were soon to contemplate their own position viz-a-viz American nuclear policy. The strategy, if it were not to work as a deterrent, it was feared, would undermine US credibility as it was predicted that some allies may drift towards a policy of neutralism in order to preserve themselves should a future nuclear exchange occur. This would most certainly hand the Cold War initiative to the Soviet Union and the fact that the inflexibility of the policy

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<sup>21</sup> Roy M. Johnson, (Rear Admiral, US Navy). Memorandum to distribution list, 'Adaptation of the National Military Posture to the Era of Nuclear Parity; a Suggested Navy Position', 3 December, 1957, pp. 1 – 6: 2. *National Security Archive* (online). Available: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/02.pdf>

allowed this contemplation to arise at a serious level is testament to the weakness of the policy. By 1958 Dulles was to changing his thoughts on the subject of the Massive Retaliation policy exactly due to the fear of losing the confidence of allies. He was fearful that “our allies are coming to feel that the US would not in fact inaugurate general nuclear war in the event of a limited attack by the Soviet Union and that...to help them will increasingly be a purely theoretical thing”<sup>22</sup>. Dulles had good reason to fear this because even though the Quemoy-Matsu crisis was resolved through the use of nuclear threats Eisenhower had said that “what point would there be in defending Quemoy and Matsu if...Taiwan and beyond were destroyed with nuclear weapons?”<sup>23</sup>. As discussed earlier in this essay there often seemed to be confusion as to the applicability of Massive Retaliation and here again was an example but this time in the midst of a crisis whereby a US ally was seeking support. Not only would a nuclear response to the launching of a limited Communist attack cause the US itself to be destroyed by a Soviet nuclear response but with the rising ability of the Soviet’s to launch a surprise attack on the US, much like the US could do to the Soviets, further fears were espoused. Strategic Air Command, the US means by which nuclear weaponry would be delivered to targets within the Soviet Union, was vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack, a move that was not beyond the bounds of possibility for the US had contemplated launching a pre-emptive strike on Soviet nuclear facilities in order to prevent a nuclear arms race and the possibility of the US itself being destroyed in a nuclear exchange. This was discussed earlier in the Eisenhower presidency but by 1957 this was deemed impossible due to Soviet missile installations being kept under total secrecy while “SAC

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<sup>22</sup> Gerard Smith, (Assistant Secretary – Policy Planning). Memorandum of Conversation with: John Foster Dulles and members of the Department of Defence. 20 June, 1969, pp. 1 – 10: 2. *National Security Archive* (online). Available: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/special/doc07.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> Campbell Craig, *Destroying the village: Eisenhower and thermonuclear war* (New York, 1998), p.85.

cannot get to Russia before the Soviet SAC launches”<sup>24</sup>. At this stage then Massive Retaliation had proven itself to be inflexible, viewed as untrustworthy by US allies and now it had also brought about, to a considerable degree, the threat of a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States. Due to the lead that the Soviets held in ICBM design at this time the US had no real protection against Soviet nuclear weapons as its SAC was quite vulnerable to a surprise attack of which there would only be a warning time of up to 30 minutes. The report, *Security and Deterrence in the Nuclear Age*, more commonly known as the Gaither Report, stated in 1957 that “the current vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack...and the threat posed to SAC by the prospects of an early Russian ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial action”<sup>25</sup>. However Eisenhower had actually, upon the recommendations of his scientific advisors, given the approval to a full scale ICBM and IRBM missile development programme back in 1955 due to intelligence that the Soviets were far ahead with their own research<sup>26</sup>. Despite this the US was still far behind Soviet developments come the year of the Gaither Report which showed again that the Massive Retaliation policy was not working to the terms of its founding document NSC 162/2 which had stated that the US had to “conduct and foster scientific research...for (the) successful prosecution of a general war”<sup>27</sup>. It should be noted that Eisenhower was relatively calm in his reaction to the confirmation of a powerful Soviet ICBM through the launch of Sputnik and this is something that should be commended for Sputnik itself posed no threat to the US and while the threat of Soviet ICBM’s, while great, may still have been exaggerated by others for political benefit, it is the broader picture that

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<sup>24</sup> Roy M. Johnson, (Rear Admiral, US Navy). Memorandum to distribution list, ‘Adaptation of the National Military Posture to the Era of Nuclear Parity; a Suggested Navy Position’, 3 December, 1957, pp. 1 – 6: 1. *National Security Archive* (online). Available: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/02.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Security Resources Panel, ‘Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The Gaither Report)’, Science Advisory Committee (Washington DC, 1957), pp. 1 – 34: 5. Available: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/nitze02.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House years: Mandate for change* (New York, 1963), p.456.

<sup>27</sup> James S. Lay, ‘A Report to the National Security Council (NSC 162/2)’, National Security Council (Washington DC, 1953), pp. 1 – 27: 7. Available: <http://ftp.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf>

must be examined. Eisenhower and Dulles, through their Atoms for Peace concept, were possibly searching for an exit strategy from the all or nothing approach that the inflexible Massive Retaliation policy had given them. This had failed and so the policy had to continue which resulted in the Soviet development of their nuclear force and their own ICBM's. The primary reason for the development of this Soviet force was the earlier development of a comparable American force and as such then the Massive Retaliation policy had brought about an arms race in the area of nuclear weaponry and the attached delivery systems. While a nuclear war did not occur, perhaps giving credence to the point that a mutual stalemate had been brought about by relatively equal nuclear forces, there had never been a greater threat of it than under Eisenhower's presidency due to the policy of which he pursued and surely this must be viewed as being one of his greatest failings.

The policy of Massive Retaliation was one that on the surface appeared strong and readily designed to prevent either China or the Soviet Union from pursuing any aggressive policies towards the West. However the actual substance of the policy was seen to be sorely lacking especially as Eisenhower went through his second term in office. This was not because the policy was not a benevolent one but simply because it failed to predict accurately the future situation of the Soviet Union having an ability as large as that of America's itself, to launch a nuclear strike. At the same time there was confusion through the administration on just what the policy would mean and when and how it would ever be used. Initially though the policy was an extremely practical and forward-looking one which would deal with two of the most pressing elements confronting the newly installed Eisenhower administration. It would bring about a doctrine for nuclear weapons policy while also assisting Eisenhower in his noble desire to take America's focus away from massive military spending and more towards building a country which would serve as a better example of the capitalist way of life

for the rest of the world to see. While it can be argued that the policy was indeed not a complete failure, the situations of the time tend to go against this grain of thought as the US military believed that “Hungary was defaulted primarily for lack of divisions in Europe”<sup>28</sup>. This may not necessarily be true because neither did the US have enough divisions in either Quemoy-Matsu or perhaps even towards the ending of the Korean War, both of which the US garnered results through using nuclear diplomacy. However on the international stage, as a whole, the policy was always on the edge of failure because severe doubts were felt about US commitment to its allies due to the all-or-nothing premise of the policy and the almost certain destruction of the US itself in defence of an ally. These doubts were compounded as time went by and the revelation by Moscow that the Soviet Union had an advanced nuclear strike capability, thus cancelling out any psychological threat effects that Massive Retaliation still held. In hindsight perhaps the policy could never have been a success for it was inevitable that it would launch a nuclear arms race as Moscow could not afford to be unresponsive towards the threat of complete nuclear annihilation. This race, with the launch of Sputnik and growing Soviet economic progress, seemed to be one that America was slowly beginning to lose and brought forth the opportunity for many in America to proclaim a missile gap and to exaggerate the Soviet threat for political gain. Overall then the policy was one which began with promise but which almost inevitably made the US less safe than it could have been had it not brought upon itself an opposing apocalyptic threat.

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<sup>28</sup> Roy M. Johnson, (Rear Admiral, US Navy). Memorandum to distribution list, ‘Adaptation of the National Military Posture to the Era of Nuclear Parity; a Suggested Navy Position’, 3 December, 1957, pp. 1 – 6: 5. *National Security Archive* (online). Available: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/02.pdf>

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